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Abstract
We discuss how inclusive institutions enhance technological change, the main driver 
of long-term economic growth. Specifically, institutions that promote female political 
empowerment advance technological change through a) increasing the number and 
variability of new ideas introduced in the economy and b) improving the selection of 
more efficient ideas. We test different implications from our argument by measuring 
three aspects of empowerment – descriptive representation, civil liberties protection, 
and civil society participation – across 182 countries and 221 years. Empowerment is 
positively related to subsequent growth, even when accounting for initial differences in 
income, past growth rates, democracy, and country- and year-fixed effects. The three 
sub-components of empowerment are also, individually, related to growth, although 
not as strongly as the aggregated concept. The relationship is retained across different 
regimes, time periods, and geographic contexts, but is clearer for “Non-Western” coun-
tries. Finally, empowerment enhances TFP growth, a proxy for technological change.
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1 Introduction
To what extent does a country’s economic development rely on its political institutions? A
large literature spanning economic history, economics, and political science has been pre-
occupied with this broad, and very important, question for decades (North, 1990; Rodrik,
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Gerring et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Yet, we
lack a clear understanding of which specific institutions are more and less important, despite
researchers acknowledging that “good institutions” enhance development. A second litera-
ture emphasizes the role of inclusion of more particular social groups in positions of power
and decision-making, with a special focus on the inclusion of women. Female empowerment
is not only a normative ideal in itself, but may have instrumental value for other valuable
outcomes (e.g., Sundstro¨m et al., 2017), including economic development (e.g., Duflo, 2012).
In this paper, we bridge these two literatures by focusing on how open and inclusive
political institutions influence countries’ trajectories of economic development by empow-
ering and including a broad population group that is otherwise often excluded, namely
women. We rely on a broad definition of female political empowerment, which includes in-
creased capacity for women to influence political decision-making through three pathways:
1) descriptive political representation; 2) freedom of choice, guaranteed by protected civil
liberties; and 3) opportunity to express their voice. Existing studies on political institutions
and development have mainly focused on how institutions influence capital investments. Yet,
growth economists propose that technological change is the main driver of long-term growth
([ Romer, 1990; Acemoglu, 2008). We present an argument and empirical analysis indicating
how female empowerment contributes to technological change. Specifically, our theoretical
argument focuses on how institutional features that promote female political empowerment
affect technological change through a) increasing the number and variability of new ideas
introduced in the economy and b) improving how efficiently the best, new ideas are adopted.
Women constitute the majority of the adult population in many countries, and excluding
women from processes of idea generation and selection should have substantial implications
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for a society’s ability to generate technological change.
We test various implications from this argument using extensive data from the Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2020) to measure the three mentioned
aspects of female political empowerment. Across 182 countries and time series extending for
221 years, we find robust evidence that female political empowerment (FPE) is positively
related to subsequent GDP per capita growth. This relationship holds up when accounting
for initial differences in economic development, democracy levels, and country- and year-
fixed effects. When disaggregating FPE into its sub-components, we find that descriptive
political representation, civil liberties protection, and civil society participation are all, in-
dividually, related to growth. Further, the overall relationship between FPE and growth is
retained across different contexts, but is stronger and more robust for “Non-Western” than
for “Western” countries. Finally, when disaggregating the sources of economic growth, we
find that FPE enhances total factor productivity growth, a proxy for technological change.
In the following, we first review relevant studies on institutions and economic growth,
before we consider studies on the consequences of political inclusion and representation
of women, more specifically. Next, we present our theoretical argument on how female
political empowerment enhances technological change, which, in turn, enhances economic
growth. We thereafter present our data and research design, before we present and discuss
our empirical results. In the concluding section, we discuss the real-world relevance of our
findings. For many people, including political leaders, female political empowerment is of
intrinsic normative value, and additional motivation for ensuring equal participation and
protection of rights across genders is not needed. Insofar as women’s rights are human
rights (Bunch, 1990), women should have the same basic opportunities as men, including
an equal say in decisions on how to govern society. Yet, countries across the world still
vary enormously in how empowered women are, politically. The “business case” that we
present might contribute to incentivizing initially hesitant leaders and social groups – albeit
for instrumental reasons – to improve female political empowerment.
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2 Relevant literatures
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical literatures that
serve as building blocks for our argument, which is presented in the following section. We
first review studies on (immediate and deep) determinants of economic growth, focusing on
arguments and evidence pertaining to how institutions shape technological change. Next, we
review studies addressing how different aspects of female empowerment influence economic
outcomes.
2.1 Economic growth, and the role of institutions
Growth economists have, for decades, studied the “immediate determinants” of growth (e.g.,
Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004; Helpman, 2004; Acemoglu, 2008). Several theoretical mod-
els specify how different such determinants feed into growth processes (e.g., Solow, 1956;
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Romer, 1990) and “growth accounting” exercises (e.g.,
Young, 1995; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Baier, Dwyer Jr. and Tamura, 2006) have
assessed how much of growth in national income or production (both typically measured by
GDP per capita) come from the various determinants. Immediate determinants are either
classified as factor inputs in production processes – notably labour hours, physical capital,
human capital, land, and natural resources – or as ways in which these inputs are combined
into producing output, referred to by the broad concept of “technology”. This concept covers
specific production technologies, but also ideas about economic policies and how economic
processes are organized. The presumed relative importance of different immediate determi-
nants in influencing short-, medium-, and long-term growth varies across theoretical models.
Yet, the most prominent ones – both among so-called neo-classical- and endogenous growth
models – highlight that accumulation of factor inputs, such as labor and capital, may boost
growth in the short- to medium term, but not in the longer term (as returns to accumulating
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more inputs decrease). In contrast, technological change drives long-run growth.1
The introduction of new ideas and production technologies to an economy can come
from domestic innovation or from the adoption (and possibly adaptation) of technology
developed abroad. Several economists focus primarily on processes of innovation for un-
derstanding technological change. Romer (1990), for example, introduces a “new growth
model”, where profit-maximizing firms contribute to technological change by innovating and
supplying a wider variety of new products. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992) model technological change as generated by firms investing in innovation of
improved products that replace existing products of inferior quality. Yet, since ideas are
“non-rivalrous” (see Romer, 1993), production and organization technologies can, at least
in principle, be used to enhance efficiency also in other countries than where they originate
from. Indeed, most production and organization technologies in use in any current econ-
omy come from abroad. Diffusion of foreign technology is especially important for small
countries and poor countries far away from the “global technological frontier”. Hence, in
order to understand technological change, and thereby persistent differences in growth rates
across countries, we must understand why some countries are better than others at adopting
production techniques and ideas developed elsewhere, and at diffusing them within their
economies.
So-called “evolutionary growth models” (see, e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 2005;
Verspagen, 2005) are relevant in this regard. This strand of growth theory has developed
models that draw on key notions from evolutionary biology to assess which factors enhance
the adoption of new and more efficient technologies. The two key inputs to such processes
are a) an increased variety of new ideas being introduced to the economy – partly from
domestic processes of innovation, but notably through diffusion of ideas from abroad – and
b) mechanisms for ensuring the selection of the more efficient ideas. A large variety of
1We remark that the sharp distinction between how factor inputs and technology feed into growth is a
simplification; investments in new machinery may introduce new technology (Nelson, 2005) and high human
capital levels facilitate the adoption of more efficient technologies (Kremer, 1993a).
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competing ideas and technologies enhances economic efficiency, especially when it is unclear
a priori how ideas and technologies will work in practice; economic actors learn how effective
they are from processes of trial and error (North, 2005). Regarding the selection of ideas,
this process reduces variety as new techniques are adopted through learning and less efficient
techniques are discarded. An economy thus requires the steady introduction of novel ideas
to keep up variety. Factors that simultaneously allow for the introduction of new ideas and
enable improved selection and diffusion processes are therefore especially likely to enhance
technological change. This insight is central in our theoretical argument below.
So-called deeper determinants of economic growth (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi,
2004) are located prior in the causal chain to the immediate determinants discussed above.
Suggested deeper determinants include cultural norms and practices, various geographic
features, and demographic factors (see, respectively, Landes, 1998; Diamond, 1997; Kremer,
1993b). Yet, the perhaps most studied deeper determinant is “good institutions” (e.g., North,
1990; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Acemoglu, John-
son and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). By influencing which economic
policies are selected, and determining the expected costs and risks to investors, institutions
presumably affects capital accumulation (e.g., North, 1990; Bizzarro et al., 2018). But, more
importantly for long-term growth, institutions may also influence innovation and the adop-
tion of new technologies. For example, institutions ensuring the protection of intellectual
property rights may strengthen incentives for firms to invest in innovation activities (Romer,
1990). Further, protection of civil liberties (Knutsen, 2015) or competitive multi-party elec-
tions (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009) may enhance both the variety of ideas introduced
into the economy and improve selection of the more efficient ideas. Open and inclusive po-
litical institutions “more readily generate a range of solution to problems; they more readily
experiment with solutions to problems; and they more readily discard ideas and leaders who
fail to solve them” (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009: 134). By enabling different popu-
lation groups – and thus more creative minds – to enter political debates and take part in
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economic interactions, open and inclusive institutions enhances technological change, and
thereby growth.
Despite the plausibility of the argument that “institutions matter” for growth, scholars
have yet to conclude on exactly which particular institutions that matter the most. Some
authors focus on features of the public administration (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Fukuyama,
2014). Others argue that low levels of corruption and impartiality determine development
outcomes (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Yet others highlight the role of institutionalized
political parties (Bizzarro et al., 2018). Finally, democracy, and especially competitive multi-
party elections, is another prominent explanation for economic growth, although empirical
results are not robust (Przeworski et al., 2000; Gerring et al., 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2019).
In this paper, we focus on institutions that further female political empowerment. We argue
that such institutions enhance growth through enhancing both the variety of new ideas and
the selection of more efficient ones, thereby leading to more rapid technological change.
Before we present our argument, however, we review existing studies that relate aspects of
female empowerment to economic outcomes.
2.2 Economic consequences of female empowerment
Several studies have proposed that gender equality and female empowerment may relate
to economic outcomes, including growth and its immediate determinants (for reviews, see
Cuberes and Teignier, 2014; Duflo, 2012; Kabeer and Natali, 2013). The most intensively
studied outcomes are female labor participation and education outcomes.
Regarding the former, Esteve-Volart (2004) presents a theoretical model indicating the
inefficiency and negative economic consequences of excluding women from labor participa-
tion. In this model, individuals are born with a given talent, and restricting the access of
women to managerial positions leads to loss of talent in the positions where they are the
most productive. This gives diminished innovation and slower technology adoption, thereby
reducing productivity growth. Such exclusion of women thus gives lower equilibrium wages,
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both for male and female workers. Further, restricting the type of work women can do,
more generally in the economy, to only home production, reduces income also due to the
inherently lower productivity of such production. Finally, both types of exclusion – from
managerial positions and from general production in certain sectors – leads to lower invest-
ment in human capital, which further contributes to lower growth rates. Similarly, building
a model of heterogeneous talents in a population, Cuberes and Teignier (2012) show how
barriers for women to become managers significantly reduce the average talent available in
the economy, and thereby aggregate productivity and income levels. Their cross-country
estimates indicate that the loss in GDP per capita is about 12 percent when women cannot
take managerial positions, and about 40 percent when women are completely excluded from
the labor market. The estimated income loss in the mid-2000s for countries in the Middle
East and North Africa, the region with the highest exclusion rates for women, is 27 percent.
Similarly, studies suggest that gender gaps in education hurt economic growth directly due
to reduced human capital, with potential ramifications also for technological change (Klasen,
2002; Klasen and Lamanna, 2009; Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen, 2002; The´venon et al., 2012).
Education for women also carries other externalities, such as reduced fertility and improved
child-care and child survival, that enhance the human capital of future generations, and
thus growth (for reviews, see Mitra, Bang and Biswas, 2015; Duflo, 2012). Using panel data,
Klasen and Lamanna (2009) and The´venon et al. (2012) investigate the effects of gender
gaps in education and labor force participation, and find that such gaps are associated with
reduced economic growth. In OECD countries, on average, an additional year of education
for girls is estimated to give 10 percent higher GDP per capita (The´venon et al., 2012).
In sum, the literature convincingly shows that there is a positive relationship between
higher education levels and labor force participation among women and economic growth.
However, we know less about the effects of other types of female empowerment. Mitra, Bang
and Biswas (2015) argue that gender equality is a multi-dimensional concept, consisting of
distinct features that may have different effects on economic growth. Mitra, Bang and Biswas
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(2015) thus create two distinct indices of female empowerment. They find that equality in
economic opportunity (a combined index of a literacy gap, secondary enrollment gap and
fertility rate) is associated with growth in developing countries, while equality in economic
and political outcomes (index of labor force participation gap and percent of women in
parliament) displays this association in developed economies. Yet, despite the evidence
presented by Mitra, Bang and Biswas (2015), we still lack in understanding of exactly how
the political exclusion of women, along different dimensions, affect economic growth. In
the following, we argue that female political empowerment have positive implications for
technological change in both developing and developed countries.
3 Argument
Following (Sundstro¨m et al., 2017), we adopt a broad definition of female political empow-
erment (FPE) as “a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice,
agency, and participation in societal decision-making”. Hence, we go beyond descriptive
political representation and also cover freedom of choice guaranteed through civil liberties
protection and the ability to voice ideas and preferences. Rather than focusing on whether
women have access to particular resources such as education or land, we consider the extent
to which women have access to political power and are able to distribute resources and in-
fluence decisions, more generally (Longwe, 2000). Before we dig deeper into the particular
mechanisms, linked to various aspects of FPE and how they influence the variation in new
ideas or the selection of more efficient ones, we summarize the core logic of the argument.
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of the main steps in the argument. Our concept
of FPE has three sub-components. The first sub-component pertains to enhanced freedom
of choice for women in different spheres, notably related to strengthened civil liberties. The
second relates to improved representation for women in key arenas of political decision-
making, including the legislature and executive. The third pertains to women being able
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Figure 1: Sketch of the main components and links in our argument
to actively voice their preferences and ideas though various forms of civic participation.
Political institutions that enhance any one of these sub-components may also enhance the
rate of technological change. As Figure 1 shows, we surmise that all three sub-components
have independent effects on the variety of new ideas introduced into the economy as well as
the selection of more efficient ideas. These are the two key determinants of technological
change, according to the evolutionary growth models reviewed above. Since technological
change shapes economic growth, we further anticipate links between all three sub-components
and GDP per capita growth rates, and an even stronger link between the aggregated concept
of FPE and growth. Let us now turn to plausible, more specific mechanisms, which we sort
according to FPE’s three sub-components.
3.1 Descriptive political representation
Arguments along the lines of Esteve-Volart (2004), which suggest that excluding women (and
thus about half the population of any country) from key positions is economically inefficient,
can be translated to the area of political representation. Political arenas such as legislatures
9
and executives (or local councils, for that matters) are where many vital decisions about how
a society develops, including its economy, are made. If we assume that a) economic and other
policies matter economic development, and b) the quality of policies depends on characteris-
tics of the decision makers, we can expect that changes in descriptive political representation
affect development.2 Bringing in women in politics not only expands the country’s “political
talent pool”, but evens increases the variance in other relevant characteristics of representa-
tives such as types of experience, knowledge, or even policy preferences (e.g., Khan, 2017).
This, in turn, enhances the quality of deliberation by bringing in new and different ideas,
and thereby increases the chances of adopting policies that benefit a broad segment of the
population (Mansbridge, 1999). Hence, improved descriptive representation of women may
increase both the variation of policy ideas and improve the process of selecting the “best”
such ideas.
Existing studies show systematic differences in the policy preferences of women and
men (Khan, 2017). Given these differences, increased female representation may lead to
the selection of certain policies that are (objectively) better at generating at least certain
development outcomes. At the micro level, women invest more in goods and services that
improve the well-being of families and that improve education and health-care outcomes
(Duflo, 2012). At a more aggregate level, Miller (2008) shows that introduction of women
suffrage in the United States was associated with declining infant mortality due to the
qualitatively different issues that women placed on the political agenda, notably related
to health-care. Elite-level analysis reveal that female candidates present themselves in a
systematically distinct manner from men in campaigns and more often promote health-care
and education issues (Kahn, 1993). These patterns are replicated in recent years and in online
2Phillips (1995), for example, highlights that the personal characteristics of representatives are relevant
for the representation of the population and their interests, with further implications for which policies
are produced. The basic premise is that descriptive representation is required to ensure that everyone’s
interests and points of view are heard and taken into account (Birnir and Waguespack, 2011). In political
environments with competition for resources and agendas, who the political representatives are matter. If
equal representation is not achieved, adopted policies will reflect the preconditions and preconceptions of the
dominant group (Young, 2011).
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behavior (Evans and Clark, 2016; Mechkova and Wilson, 2019). Swiss, Fallon and Burgos
(2012) examine how descriptive representation influences child health across 102 developing
countries from 1980-2005, and find that compared to countries with no women in parliament,
countries meeting a 20-percent threshold experience increased rates of immunizations and
infant- and child survival.
Improved descriptive representation also has symbolic significance (Pitkin, 1967), which
could, in turn, have different substantive effects. A more representative government might
be one that citizens trust more and are more likely to engage with (Mansbridge, 1999).
Female voters may be more likely to contact female political representatives, perceiving
that their interests are better defended by someone with similar background (Mechkova and
Carlitz, 2018). Indeed, female citizens more often attend village meetings and express their
points of view with women in the local leadership (Beaman et al., 2009). Such feedback and
interactions between citizens and policy makers is crucial for identifying what policies are
appropriate for the local context and for effectively implementing them, in practice, with
downstream implications for productivity (Evans, 1995).
Better political representation can also enhance female participation in various economic
arenas. Ghani, Mani and O’Connell (2013) examines mandated political representation at
the local level in India, and find that higher female representation over extended time relates
to greater female labor force participation, partly from increased public sector employment
and partly from the building of infrastructure (e.g., related to roads and health-care) that
facilitates women entering the labor force.3 And, as proposed by Esteve-Volart (2004) and
others, increased female labor force participation leads not only to a more heterogeneous
pool of workers, but also to decision-makers in the economy, on average, being more talented,
thereby enhancing productivity growth.
3Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) also find evidence from India that elected local leaders invest in infras-
tructure that is prioritized by citizens of their own gender.
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3.2 Freedom of choice
Civil liberties include various private and political liberties (e.g., freedom of expression and
movement), physical integrity rights (e.g., freedom from forced labor and torture), as well
as property rights and rule of law with access to impartially administered justice. Such
liberties are differentially protected across countries and political systems, but also varies
between groups within a country. Typically, women’s liberties are worse protected than
men’s (e.g., World Bank, 2020b). This lack of protection for women may have downstream
implications for macroeconomic performance. Several studies propose that the protection of
different civil liberties matter for growth through affecting incentives to invest in capital and,
notably, via influencing processes of innovation and idea diffusion (and thus technological
change). Insofar as women constitute half of the population, arguments credibly linking the
protection of civil liberties to technological change and economic growth should be highly
relevant also when it comes to women’s civil liberties, more specifically. We review two
relevant such arguments.
One prominent “institutionalist explanation” of economic growth focuses on institutions
that ensure property rights are protected for broad segments of the population (e.g., North,
1990; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Assessments of risks and the expected profits
of prospective investment objects hinge on investors’ perception of whether their future
rights to the investment object (and revenue generated from it) are protected from theft,
expropriation, and other infringements. If so, the expected returns to an investment object
more likely outweigh expected costs, leading to more investments and thus higher income
levels (Olson, 1993). Importantly for our argument focusing on technological change, well-
functioning rule of law and stable property rights reduce various risks and expected costs
of investing in costly research and development-related activities (e.g., North, 1990; Romer,
1990). Whenever poor property rights protection pertains to half the adult population
(women), aggregated investment levels and productivity growth will decline.
Adding to the general argument, Goltz, Buche and Pathak (2015) find an interaction
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effect between rule of law and women’s descriptive representation on female entrepreneurship
– reforms aimed at stimulating women’s economic participation, enforced by female political
representatives, may be less effective when rule of law is weak. However, Goltz, Buche
and Pathak (2015) consider rule of law at the country-level without accounting for women
often facing disproportionate infringements. Goldstein and Udry (2008) study Ghana, where
women have less secure tenure rights than men. This hinders women from leaving their land
for a long fallow, despite the clear productivity benefits of this practice when fertilizers are too
expensive. The result is lower productivity on female-owned plots, and even within the same
household, women achieve significantly lower profits than their husbands (p.995). Similarly,
Duflo (2012) proposes the relatively weaker property rights for women as an explanation for
why households invest less in labor and fertilizers in plots owned by women.
The second type of argument focuses on private and political liberties – notably freedoms
of speech, media, and movement – for increasing variation in new ideas and for selecting
the more efficient ones.4 Knutsen (2015) details how free speech and open debate allow
entrepreneurs, decision-makers in firms, non-governmental organizations, bureaucrats, and
politicians to better adopt and disseminate ideas from abroad and identify and discard
less efficient solutions. Even when motivated by purely political reasons such as restricting
opposition mobilizing against the regime, restrictions on communication and free speech may
unintentionally suppress the diffusion of economically relevant ideas; in practice, it is very
difficult to enforce restrictions on free speech that filter out politically from economically
relevant ideas. In other words, different actors may more freely identify and disseminate
new organization and production techniques when civil liberties are protected. Protection of
such liberties also enables a more critical evaluation of ideas – including critical comparisons
of new ideas and technologies to old, traditional ones – thereby enhancing the selection of
more efficient ones. Knutsen (2015) finds empirical support for the notion that stronger civil
4Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) considers the economic consequences of gender-specific violations of such
rights, and finds that violations on freedom of movement affect women disproportionately, with negative
consequences for female employment.
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liberties protection enhance technological change and, subsequently, economic growth (see
also Dahlum, Knutsen and Lindberg, 2018). This leads us to expect that stronger protection
of civil liberties for women, more specifically, enhances technological change and economic
growth.
3.3 Voice
Finally, we consider whether ordinary women are able to effectively voice their preferences
and ideas through civic participation, be it through political discussions in the private sphere
or through various organizations. As summarized by Sundstro¨m et al. (2017), to be politi-
cally empowered, women must have the opportunity to freely express political views, organize
collectively, and be represented in the ranks of journalists. As already indicated in our dis-
cussion of civil liberties, the openness of societies aids the adoption of new and more effective
technologies, as various freedoms of discussion, press, and organization promote the learn-
ing and critical assessment of new ideas. Further, in closed societies policy-development
and innovation might be hindered if people are restricted from partaking in organizations
and engaging in other forms of collective action. Non-governmental organizations – due to
their specialized knowledge and by voicing the preferences of relevant, interested parties –
play a prominent role in providing inputs to the formulation and effective implementation of
policies (Evans, 1995). Restricting the ability of key population groups to organize and ac-
tively partake in civil society thus restricts relevant feedback to the government officials who
formulate economic policies. In societies where civil society participation and information
sharing between non-governmental organizations and the government is heavily regulated or
even forbidden, fewer, unconventional inputs and viewpoints are presented to policy makers,
making it harder for them to identify the full range of options or detect flaws in favored
policies (North, 2005).
Women being included in political discussions and organizational life should thus improve
the quality of policies by expanding the variety of inputs to policy-making processes (Birnir
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and Waguespack, 2011). Further, contexts with representation of diverse interests may also
produce a more cooperative atmosphere, where minority groups are more likely to speak out
to defend their interests and the dominant group more prepared to listen to different views
(Kanter, 2008). Thus, in gender-inclusive organizations and societies, new and alternative
viewpoints on economic policies may be stimulated, helping policy makers in the inherently
difficult task of selecting efficient policies with potential macroeconomic benefits.
4 Data
Until recently, data limitations would have hindered our ability to systematically test im-
plications from the above argument on extensive data material. However, the recent V-
Dem dataset, v.9 (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard,
Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning,
Staton, Wilson, Cornell, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Ilchenko, Krusell, Maxwell, Mechkova, Medzi-
horsky, Pernes, von Romer, Stepanova, Sundstrom, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt, 2019;
Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken,
Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cor-
nell, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Mechkova, von Romer, Sundstrom, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt,
2019) contains measures are well suited for the purpose. The measures that we employ have
extensive coverage and match up well with the theoretical concepts of interest by coding
gender-specific features of political representation, civil liberties, and civil society participa-
tion. Hence, we can capture the different, relevant aspects of female political empowerment
while simultaneously conducting stringent tests that require long time series, for example by
including country- and year-fixed effects in our models.
We refer to Coppedge et al. (2020) for details on the construction, methodology and con-
tents of the V-Dem dataset. But, in brief, the dataset is constructed to ensure measures that
are comparable across countries and over time, and that carry a high degree of reliability
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and validity. The data-generating process and aggregation schemes for the different indica-
tors and indices are fully transparent. About half of the indicators are more objective and
coded by research assistants (e.g., share of adult population with de jure voting rights) and
the other half are more evaluative in nature (e.g., extent of election violence) and assigned
scores on the basis of expert surveys. Normally, at least five independent experts score each
indicator (per country-year). Experts vary by question/subject area and country, and are
recruited based on their documented expertise in the particular area. Thus, the raw data
come from more than 3,200 experts, in total. V-Dem combines the assessments from different
experts by using a Bayesian item response measurement model that takes into account each
expert’s reliability, determined, inter alia, by level of agreement with other country experts
(for details, see Pemstein et al., 2018; Coppedge et al., 2020).
Concerning our main independent variable, we follow Sundstro¨m et al. (2017) in defin-
ing female political empowerment as a “a process of increasing capacity for women, leading
to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making”. We measure this
concept by drawing on V-Dem’s Female Political Empowerment index (FPE). This index
consists of three sub-indices, which are equally-weighted in the aggregation of the overall
index by taking the simple average. The first sub-index is the women’s civil liberties index,
which largely captures our theoretical freedom of choice sub-component. It is formed by
taking the point estimate from a Bayesian factor analysis on four expert-coded items. The
second sub-index is the women’s civil society participation index, which is a latent factor vari-
able estimated on three items and roughly corresponds to the theorized voice sub-component
of female political empowerment. The final sub-index is the women’s political participation
index, which captures the representation sub-component and is constructed by averaging two
indicators. Table 1 lists all indicators included in each of the three sub-indices. The aggre-
gated FPE ranges from, 0–1, where 1 indicates high level of female political empowerment.
Our main dependent variable is GDP per capita growth, measured in annualized, per-
centage terms. We mainly draw on estimates of Ln GDP per capita from Fariss et al. (2017),
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Table 1: Components and indicators entering V-Dem’s Women Political Empowerment Index
Female Political Empowerment Index
Women civil liberties index
Freedom of domestic movement women
Freedom from forced labor women
Property rights women
Access to justice women
Women civil society participation index
Freedom of discussion women
CSO women’s participation
Percent female journalists
Women political participation index
Power distributed by gender
Lower chamber female legislators
but also run tests employing GDP data from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden,
2013). The former data source allows us to extend the analysis back to 1789 and include 182
polities in our benchmark regression, whereas the latter extend back to 1800 and allow us to
include 163 polities. The estimates on (ln) GDP per capita data from Fariss et al. are arrived
at by using a dynamic latent trait model and drawing on information from different, existing
GDP and population datasets, including the Maddison data.5 One benefit with Fariss et
al.’s latent model estimation routine is that it mitigates various kinds of measurement error.
These data also mitigate missing values by imputation. For tests conducted on the original
Maddison series, we interpolate these data – which are often measured every tenth year in
the 1800s – by assuming constant growth rates across intervals with missing data. Since the
Fariss et al. time series are imputed, and predictions are presumably poorer for observations
without scores even on the extensive Maddison series, many error-prone observations are
likely dropped when using the original Maddison series. In sum, the two GDP sources have
different validity and reliability issues, and should complement each other well.
Our second dependent variable pertains to technological change. While researchers have
aimed to capture technological change with several indices and proxies (see, e.g., Knutsen,
2015), most measures lack extensive time series or cross-country coverage. The most com-
monly used proxy among growth economists is growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
5Indeed, we use the version of the Fariss et al. estimates that are benchmarked in the Maddison time
series.
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TFP growth is basically calculated as residual economic growth after removing growth stem-
ming from changes in physical capital, human capital, and labor supply.6 We draw on the
extensive TFP data from Baier, Dwyer Jr. and Tamura (2006), which cover 145 countries
with several time series extending back to the 19th century – the earliest measurement is the
United Kingdom in 1831. Baier, Dwyer Jr. and Tamura (2006) draw on various sources to
produce their growth accounting estimates, notably the Penn World Tables, World Devel-
opment Indicators, the Maddison project, and Mitchell’s historical statistics (for details, see
Baier, Dwyer Jr. and Tamura, 2002: pp. 24–26). Given the paucity of relevant historical
data sources, Baier et al. only calculate TFP with uneven intervals, and with years of mea-
surement differing across countries. Typically, the time series include a data point for about
every tenth year. We therefore follow the approach in Knutsen (2015), and interpolate these
time series by assuming constant annual growth rates in TFP in between two observations.
In the Appendix, we present descriptive statistics and map distributions of the main
variables discussed above. Regarding data sources and measures for the control variables,
we introduce them in the next section when discussing our different regression specifications.
5 Empirical analysis
We start out by assessing the empirical implication that countries where women are empow-
ered politically experience more rapid economic growth. Next, we detail this relationship by
considering whether it applies to different geographical and temporal contexts, but also by
looking more closely into whether particular sub-components of female empowerment drive
the results. Finally, we investigate the relationship between FPE and TFP growth.
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Figure 2: Scatter-plots, overlaid with (bivariate) best-fit lines and 95% confidence inter-
vals, for Female Political Empowerment (data taken from V-Dem; x-axes) and Ln GDP
per capita(data taken from the Maddison project; y-axes) in the years 1830 (top-left), 1900
(top-right), 1950 (bottom-left) and 2000 (bottom-right).
5.1 Main analysis: Female empowerment and economic growth
Before we present our benchmark panel regression, we consider some descriptive statistics and
cross-country correlations. The scatterplots in Figure 2 illustrate the positive cross-country
correlation that have existed – and been fairly persistent through modern history – between
our Female Political Empowerment (FPE) index and Ln GDP per capita as measured by
the Maddison project. Figure 3 shows equivalent plots based on the Fariss et al. data. More
specifically, the panels display scores and the best linear fit from the years 1830, 1900, 1950,
and 2000. Also for (annual) GDP per capita growth rates, there is a clear difference, on
6Since it is calculated as residual growth after, TFP growth can stem from other processes than techno-
logical change that are left unaccounted for in the growth accounting exercise. These include increases in
prices for major exports and natural resource discoveries. Yet, technological change is widely considered as
the main source behind TFP growth, especially in the longer run, by growth economists.
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Figure 3: Scatter-plots, overlaid with (bivariate) best-fit lines and 95% confidence inter-
vals, for Female Political Empowerment (data taken from V-Dem; x-axes) and Ln GDP per
capita(data taken from Farris 2017; y-axes) in the years 1830 (top-left), 1900 (top-right),
1950 (bottom-left) and 2000 (bottom-right).
average, between countries that have low and high female political empowerment. When
dividing the 21,853 observations into quartiles on the FPE index – with 0.172 marking the
cut-off for the lowest quartile, 0.344 the median, and 0.611 the highest quartile – we find
that average growth rates, based on the Fariss et al. data, increase monotonically and quite
substantially with FPE quartiles. The lowest quartile of FPE observations has an average
GDP per capita growth rate of 0.2 percent, and the second quartile grows, on average, at 0.6
percent. In contrast, the third quartile exhibited average growth of 1.5, whereas the upper
quartile grew at 2.7. When using the Maddison time series (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013),
which has numerous missing observations particularly among colonies and 19th century
countries, the corresponding growth rates are, respectively, 1.2, 1.2, 2.0, and 2.9. Countries
where women are politically empowered display much higher economic growth, on average.
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Yet, the strong, positive correlation may stem from various sources, including the reverse
causal relationship and that different (observable or unobservable) confounders systemat-
ically affect both female empowerment and growth in particular directions. For instance,
political-historical and cultural characteristics that are prevalent in certain countries (e.g., in
Western Europe and North America) could enhance both female empowerment and growth.
Alternatively, confounding may come from time-specific factors; certain decades of modern
history may have given birth to ideological or technological trends that boosted female em-
powerment as well as growth. For these reasons, our benchmark OLS specification includes
both country- and year-fixed effects. Further, we cluster errors by country to account for
panel-level heteroskedasticiy and autocorrelation.
The theoretical discussion suggested that substantial time may pass before the hypothe-
sized effect from female empowerment is transmitted – via public policies and, in turn, their
impact on the behavior of firms and other economic agents – to technological change and
observed GDP per capita growth rates. While the exact lag-time of these processes are hard
to theorize and identify, we assume a five-year lag in our benchmark. We also test specifi-
cations where we measure growth closer (in time) to or further away from the independent
variables. We start out by analyzing country-years as unit of analysis to capture as much
information as possible and thus maximize efficiency. Yet, we also try out 5- and 10-year
panel structures, which have the benefits of smoothing out measurement errors and further
mitigating autocorrelation.
Concerning other covariates than the country- and year-fixed effects, we intentionally
keep our benchmark specification sparse to minimize missing due to listwise deletion and,
more importantly, mitigate post-treatment bias. The latter concern pertains to the possi-
bility that variables such as democracy or state capacity may be affected by female political
empowerment. Controlling for such institutional features could thus “block off” relevant in-
direct effects that we want to capture as part of our estimated, overall relationship. Hence,
the only additional covariate in our benchmark is initial Ln GDP per capita, as richer coun-
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tries likely have better track-records of female empowerment, but also – due to standard
conditional convergence mechanisms (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004) – slower growth rates.
In alternative specifications, we introduce more covariates that may – even if we risk intro-
ducing post-treatment bias – also act as confounders. One example of such a (questionable)
extra control is regime type, as democracy may both causally affect female empowerment
and be influenced by it. (Indeed, even the conceptual boundaries between democracy and
FPR are unclear, as both consider, e.g., political participation and protection of rights.)
Hence, we test models excluding and models including democracy, as measured by V-Dem’s
Polyarchy index (Teorell et al., 2019)
Model 1.1 in Table 2 is the benchmark OLS specification on growth with country-year
as unit of analysis and using the GDP data from (Fariss et al., 2017). As discussed, this
model controls for country- and year- fixed effects in addition to initial Ln GDP per capita.
The dependent variable is the annual percentage change in GDP per capita five years after
independent variables are measured, i.e., the growth rate in t + 5. The model draws on
15,879 country-year observations from 182 countries, with maximum time series extending
across 221 years. As expected, there is a positive relationship between FPE and growth,
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The point estimate indicates that going
from the first quartile score on FPE (.20; e.g., Italy under Mussolini in the 1930s) to the
third quartile score (.61; Australia in the 1950s) increases annual GDP per capita growth
with about 0.9 percentage points. The long-term consequences of such a difference in growth
rates are substantial. Consider two countries, A and B, that start out with identical GDP
per capita levels; and where A starts growing at a 0.9 percentage point higher rate. After
10 years, A’s GDP per capita is about 9 percentage points higher than B’s. After 20 years,
this difference has increased to 20 percent, and after 40 years to 43 percent. If we consider
an even larger change in FPE, going from the 10th percentile (.11; The Two Siciles in the
1820s or Sudan in the 1920s) to the 90th (.82; Canada or New Zealand in the 1970s), the
corresponding numbers for, respectively, 10, 20 and 40 years are differences in GDP per
22
capita of about 16, 35 and 84 percent. If the estimates of Model 1.1 are on point, improving
female political empowerment has substantial consequences for long-term developments in
income. As shown by the equivalent Model 1.2, which uses GDP data from Maddison, the
result is robust to using different data sources for measuring income level and growth.
Table 2: Main analysis: Fixed effects OLS regressions on GDP per capita growth or Ln GDP
p.c. measured in t + 5
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6)
DV: GDP p.c. growth in year t+5 DV: Ln GDP p.c. in year t+5
Panel length 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 5 yrs 5yrs
GDP data source Fariss Maddison Fariss Maddison Fariss Maddison
b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t)
Female pol. empowerment 2.158*** 1.967** 0.110*** 0.114** 0.151*** 0.123**
(2.719) (2.151) (2.763) (2.508) (2.915) (2.439)
Ln GDP per capita -1.237*** -2.533*** 0.937*** 0.892*** 0.922*** 0.888***
(-5.101) (-8.268) (64.898) (64.526) (45.493) (63.205)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 15879 13362 15880 13364 3165 2762
Countries 182 163 182 163 180 162
Max time series 221 215 221 215 44 44
R2 0.029 0.085 0.945 0.948 0.933 0.947
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Errors are clustered by country. Covariates measured 5 years before DV.
One alternative way of specifying growth models, which is popular among growth economists
and has some distinct advantages (and disadvantages) from using GDP per capita growth
as dependent variable, is using forward-lagged Ln GDP per capita level as the dependent
variable.7 This alternative specification is less affected by measurement errors and other
sources of “noise” (business cycle fluctuations, big changes in prices for export products,
natural disasters, etc.), since GDP per capita growth rates can fluctuate widely from year
to year. Further, employing forward-lagged Ln GDP p.c. in, say, t + 5 instead of GDP
per capita growth from t + 4 to t + 5 allows us to also capture any short-term effects that
might exist, since we capture changes in income across the entire period from when initial
Ln GDP is measured (t) rather than only growth at the period’s end. The downside is that
this specification magnifies autocorrelation problems, since GDP levels display much higher
correlation with past GDP levels compared to current and past growth rates, and that it
7Mathematically, estimating the coefficient of a variable of interest on Ln GDP per capita level in t + 1,
controlling for Ln GDP per capita in t, is equivalent to estimating the coefficient of this variable on GDP
per capita growth from t to t + 1 (Hoeffler, 2002).
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models conditional convergence dynamics less well – growth is no longer a linear function of
past income levels. Given these pros and cons of these different specifications, we opted to
test both versions. Models 1.3 and 1.4 thus replicate Models 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, but
with Ln GDP per capita in t+ 5 as the dependent variable. FPE remains robust also to this
specification choice.
Yet, we noted how using Ln GDP per capita as dependent variable magnifies autocor-
relation issues, which may influence results even if we cluster the errors by country. To
mitigate this issue, we followed another conventional approach used by growth economists
and re-estimated Models 1.3 and 1.4 on 5-year panels. When measuring the dependent vari-
able with 5-year intervals, there is weaker correlation with past realizations of the outcome
than when measuring it with 1-year intervals. Results are reported in Models 1.6 and 1.7,
and once again FPE is robust.
In sum, neither the source of GDP data, the exact specification of the dependent variable,
nor choice of panel structure affects the main result; there is a clear relationship between
female political empowerment and subsequent economic growth.
5.2 Robustness tests
In order to further investigate sensitivity, we ran additional robustness tests. Most of these
tests are reported in the Appendix, but we present a selection of important ones in Table 3.
Model 2.1 is equivalent to Model 1.1 from Table 2. This is our benchmark using Fariss et
al. GDP data and growth as dependent variable, and we include it in Table 3 simply to ease
comparisons with the alternative specifications.
First, we investigated whether the FPE result is sensitive to choice of lag-structure (see
also Figure 4). Model 2.2 alters the benchmark by measuring growth only one year after
the covariates. This specification is thus intended to capture only short-term effects. FPE
remains highly significant (t = 3.3), and the coefficient actually increases in size, suggesting
a strong boost in short-term growth from improved female empowerment. This finding is
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somewhat surprising, given the theoretical discussion on the time it may take for changes in
political features to translate into new policies and subsequently technological change.
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
t-10 t-5 t-3 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+3 t+5 t+10
Figure 4: Benchmark OLS Model (similar to 1.1, Table 2), but with GDP p.c. growth
measured with various leads and lags relative to Female Political Empowerment Index. When
lag structure is indicated as t− x [t + x], outcome is measured before [after] covariates.
Indeed, the latter result raises concerns that FPE might be correlated with trends in
growth due to other causal patterns (e.g., reverse causality) than the theorized effect. How-
ever, we tested whether FPE is correlated with contemporaneous growth, and it is not; FPE
is statistically insignificant and even flips sign (see Figure 4). Moreover, FPE is not related
to growth when the latter is measured before the former. We tested both 1-, 3-, 5- and
10-year lags on growth and neither are systematically correlated with current FPE; t-values
vary between -0.4 and +0.7 and coefficients are small in magnitude. We will return to al-
ternative specifications that deal with endogeneity concerns related to past trends in growth
confounding the relationship. In brief, we do not find evidence that such patterns are driving
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our result. Hence, the most plausible interpretation of the result in Model 2.2 is, in fact,
that there exists a short-term effect of FPE on growth, in addition to the (theoretically less
surprising) medium-term effect captured by our benchmark.
As Models 2.3 (growth measured in t+ 3) and 2.4 (growth measured in t+ 10) show, the
relationship is also robust to assuming alternative intermediate and longer-term effect lags.
The FPE coefficient remains statistically significant at 5% and sizeable, even if somewhat
attenuated relative to the benchmark.
As discussed, we kept our benchmark sparse to mitigate post-treatment bias. We did not,
for example, control for democracy level, as this might be affected by female empowerment
– controlling for democracy could thus block a relevant indirect effect. However, more
democratic regimes might more easily experience improvements in female empowerment,
for example because female voters are susceptible to vote to reward, or otherwise pressure,
parties into adopting political and institutional changes that enhance female representation
in politics. If democracy also enhances growth (Gerring et al., 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2019),
omitting democracy from the regression could lead to (upward) omitted variable bias for
FPE. Model 2.5 therefore adds V-Dem’s Polyarchy index to the benchmark. Holding scores
on this index constant has the additional benefit of accounting for potential subjective coder
biases in the V-Dem data. For example, fast-growing economies could be evaluated in
an artificially positive manner on different political measures by country-experts, if strong
economic performance induces overall positive impressions of the country’s politics. Such
a bias would, presumably, jointly affect FPE and Polyarchy, and controlling for Polyarchy
should thus purge the FPE coefficient of this bias. Yet, FPE remains significant at 5%
and actually increases somewhat in size, from 2.2 to 2.6, when controlling for Polyarchy.
Likewise, FPE retains a value of 2.2 and is significant at 5% in Model 2.6, which controls for
a proxy of state capacity, namely V-Dem’s indicator on impartial and rule-following public
administration.
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Model 2.7 adds a measure of natural resource dependence (share of GDP from oil, natural
gas, coal and minerals) from Miller (2015) to the benchmark. While FPE remains sizeable,
with a coefficient of 1.5, it is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels (t = 1.4).
However, further analysis shows that much of this attenuation is due to the changing sample;
missing data on the resource dependence variable truncates the sample from 15,879 to 10,716
observations. When re-running the benchmark (Model 2.1) on this reduced sample, the FPE
point-estimate is 1.8 and the t-value is 1.6. In Model 2.8, which controls for Ln population
and where the sample is again expanded to 15,879 observations, FPE is similar in size
and significance to the benchmark. Moreover, in the “kitchen-sink” specification (Model
2.9), which simultaneously controls for Polyarchy, impartial administration, natural resource
dependence and population, FPE is actually higher than in the benchmark (2.5) with a
p-value of 0.055.
We conducted similar tests for 5-year panel specifications using Ln GDP per capita as
dependent variable. Model 2.10 replicates Model 1.5 from Table 2, measuring the dependent
variable five years after the covariates. Model 2.11 maintains the 5-year panel set-up, but
measures the outcome 10 years (i.e., two panel periods) after the covariates. This change
actually strengthes the relationship quite substantially, increasing the FPE coefficient from
0.15 to 0.28. This change was to be expected with Ln GDP p.c. as dependent variable.
With income being measured at the end of a 10-year period, we capture both the shorter-
and medium-term effects of a change in FPE. Further, in Model 2.12, we tested for the
potential endogeneity to prior trends in income growth by including three additional lags
of the dependent variable (t − 5, t − 10, and t − 15, in addition to Ln GDP p.c. measured
in t; the dependent variable is measured in t + 5). By doing so, we follow the approach by
Acemoglu et al. (2019) to account for pre-treatment patterns in income growth. The FPE
coefficient and corresponding t-value increase somewhat when doing so. Once again, there
are few empirical indications that historical trends in income growth confound the observed
relationship between FPE and subsequently measured growth.
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Still, we conducted one additional type of test to account for potential endogeneity in
FPE, running so-called System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) models. These
models are attuned to estimating relationships involving sluggish variables such as FPE (see
Blundell and Bond, 1998). In System GMM specifications, lags of differences in variables are
used to instrument for current levels, and, likewise, lags of levels are used to instrument for
current differences. The specifications reported in Table 3 model only FPE as endogenous
and use the second and third lags for instrumentation (to keep the instrument count below
the the number of cross-section units, see Roodman, 2009).8 Alternative specifications are
reported in Appendix Table A.3. Model 2.13 includes only the first lag of the dependent
variable as regressor, whereas 2.14 includes the first and second lags. Both specifications
report a statistically significant FPE coefficient that is substantially higher than in the OLS
models. While the Ar(2)-test in Model 2.13 gives some reason for concern that residual
autocorrelation affects results, the specification tests for Model 2.14 suggest that this model
may yield a consistent estimate of the effect of FPE on growth. This estimate is both positive
and substantially sizeable.
In sum, there is fairly strong evidence, from different panel regressions, that improvements
to female political empowerment enhances subsequent economic growth.
5.3 Assessing potential heterogeneity in the relationship
We wanted to check if the identified pattern is consistent across time periods, geographical
contexts, and political regime types, or if it is much stronger in some settings than oth-
ers. For these particular tests on heterogeneity, our theoretical argument does give clear
a priori expectations. If anything, we expected the relationship to be relatively persistent
across contexts, as our argument points to mechanisms that should not be contingent on
being in a particular region, historical period or regime type – female political empowerment
should enhance the variation in new ideas and the selection of more efficient ones in different
8The instrument count is also a function of number of panel units. Hence, well-specified GMM models
are impossible to achieve for the country-year set-up.
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contexts.
We ran different tests to assess potential heterogeneity in the relationship (see Appendix
Table A.4 for interaction model tests). Figure 5 (top panel) presents regression coefficients
on FPE with 95% confidence intervals from straightforward split-sample tests, where we
estimate the benchmark Model 1.1., but on limited samples. The leftmost coefficients per-
tain to, respectively, pre- and post-WWII samples. The two middle coefficients pertain to,
respectively, “Western” (Western European countries, Canada, United States, Australia,
and New Zealand) and all other countries. Finally, the two rightmost coefficients pertain
to, respectively, democracies and autocracies, where we use the Lexical Index of Electoral
Democracy by Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicˇius (2015) and require competitive elections
and universal suffrage for coding a regime as democratic. Interestingly, results indicate a
somewhat stronger and clearer estimated effect of female empowerment in autocratic con-
texts (where the rate of technological change is, overall, lower Knutsen, 2015). Further,
the estimated relationship is stronger for the pre-WWII era than the period from 1946 and
onwards, and the relationship is present and clear in “non-Western” countries, but not in
“Western” countries.
We note, however, that the split sample results based on fewer units and/or shorter time
series are sensitive to specification choices. For instance, when omitting country-fixed effects,
the relationship is large and highly significant also across the 31 included Western countries
(as well as across the 151 non-Western ones). And, when omitting year-fixed effects the
relationship is large and significant both in the pre-WWII and post-WWII samples. The
bottom panel of Figure 5 shows fairly similar results when omitting both the country-and
year-fixed effects simultaneously. In this specification, the estimated relationship is also
virtually similar (and highly significant) across regime types. While we would not put too
much trust in the latter estimates, with omitted variables biases possibly affecting results,
they serve to illustrate the more sensitive nature of the split-sample results.
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Figure 5: Coefficient plots with 95% confidence intervals for Female Political Empowerment
Index on limited samples, restricted by time period, geography, or regime type. Top panel:
Coefficients are from equivalents to benchmark Model 1.1, Table 2. Bottom panel: Cor-
responding coefficients for specifications that omit country- and year-fixed effects, but are
otherwise similar to Model 1.1., Table 2.
Next, we assessed whether the finding for the composite FPE index is driven by one
particular sub-component. We remind that the aggregated index consists of three sub-
indices – on civil liberties, political participation, and civil society participation – capturing
distinct aspects of female empowerment, and that our theoretical argument suggested that
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all three aspects should contribute to enhance technological change, and thus growth.
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Figure 6: Coefficient plots with 95% confidence intervals for Female Political Empowerment
Index and its three sub-indices. All coefficients are from equivalents to the benchmark Model
1.1, Table 2, with annual GDP per capita growth in t+ 5 as dependent variable. All indices
range from 0–1.
As anticipated, all three sub-indices are individually related to subsequent growth rates.
Figure A.1 displays coefficient plots with 95% confidence intervals for specifications akin to
the benchmark Model 1.1, Table 2. As for the aggregated FPE, all indices range from 0 to 1,
and coefficients are thus comparable. Interestingly, the composite index estimate is around
twice the size of the sub-indices, which are strikingly similar in size. Going from minimum
to maximum on any of these sub-indices is predicted to increase GDP per capita growth
rates by 1.0 to 1.2 percentage points, and all three coefficients are at least weakly significant
(10% level).9 Moreover, all three sub-indices, and especially civil liberties and political
9When we include all three sub-indices simultaneously in the benchmark, the civil society index turns
very close to 0, whereas the civil liberties (1.2; t = 1.7) and political participation (0.9; t = 1.4) indices
basically retain their sizes but obtain lower t-values.
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participation, are quite robust to specification changes such as altering the dependent variable
specification (Ln GDP p.c. instead of GDP p.c. growth) or using Maddison GDP data. In
sum, there is evidence that the different, theorized aspects of female empowerment carry an
independent relationship with subsequent growth, and that the relationship is even stronger
for the composite concept than for any of the individual sub-components.
5.4 Female empowerment and technological change
Finally, we turn to investigating another, and more specific, implication from our argument,
namely that improvements in female political empowerment should enhance technological
change. That is, even when disregarding economic growth coming from investments in
physical or human capital, we should find that FPE is related to higher residual growth, which
is presumably driven mainly by improvements in production or organization technologies.
To test this expectation, we draw on the above-described, extensive TFP data from
Baier, Dwyer Jr. and Tamura (2006). To recapitulate, these data were arrived at via
a comprehensive growth accounting exercise on 145 countries and the longest time series
(United Kingdom) extends from 1831–2000. When following the interpolation procedure
used by Knutsen (2015), we can re-run our benchmark – substituting Ln GDP per capita
from Model 1.3, Table 2 with Ln TFP – on 6827 country-year observations from 142 countries.
This specification is reported as Model 3.1 in Table 4. It reveals a positive and significant
(5% level) relationship between FPE and Ln TFP measured five years later, conditional on
initial level of Ln TFP and country- and year-fixed effects. As for Ln GDP per capita, the
FPE coefficient increases markedly in size (from .10 to .16) once measuring the outcome 10
years instead of 5 years after the covariates in Model 3.2. This latter observation suggests
that there are longer term benefits to technological efficiency from increased female political
empowerment, beyond the notable short-term benefits.
Yet, we discussed for the growth regressions how certain variables, notably including
democracy level, may be relevant controls, even if adding them could introduce post-treatment
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Table 4: Fixed effects OLS regressions on Ln Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7)
1-year panels 5-year panels
DV measured in t+ 5 t+ 10 t+ 5 t+ 5 t+ 5 t+ 5 t+ 5
b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t)
Female political empowerment 0.097** 0.157** 0.077 0.077* 0.087** 0.108** 0.109*
(2.274) (2.023) (1.387) (1.693) (2.059) (2.031) (1.657)
Ln TFP 0.931*** 0.636*** 0.933*** 0.941*** 0.909*** 0.938*** 0.940***
(37.354) (12.490) (35.683) (31.914) (32.693) (36.227) (34.915)
Polyarchy 0.018 -0.001
(0.468) (-0.022)
Resource dependence -0.002***
(-2.743)
Ln population -0.056**
(-2.140)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 6827 6124 6790 6227 6689 1456 1447
R2 0.838 0.606 0.837 0.839 0.832 0.825 0.824
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Errors are clustered by country.
bias for FPE. The same points apply here. Model 3.3 therefore includes V-Dem’s Polyarchy
Index as an additional control, and this attenuates the FPE coefficient by about 20 percent
(from 0.097 to 0.077) relative to the benchmark. Moreover, FPE now turns statistically
insignificant at conventional levels (t = 1.4). We also tested a model controlling for V-Dem’s
impartial public administration described above, and – similarly to the results for Model
3.3 controlling for Polyarchy – the relationship turns insignificant. In contrast, the positive
relationship between FPE and Ln TFP measured five years later is robust to controlling for
natural resource dependence (Model 3.4) or population size (Model 3.5). Still, and in con-
trast with the GDP per capita regressions, the FPE coefficient on TFP growth is sensitive
to the control strategy.
The lack of robustness for the relationship with TFP growth may stem from different
factors. First, the GDP regressions included far more country-year observations, thus giving
us more efficient estimates and a lower likelihood of conducting Type II errors. Further,
the results for Models 3.1–3.5 may be weakened by measurement error induced from the
interpolation routine in the country-year panels. The TFP data are originally measured
with intervals of several years (typically 10) between each data point, and the interpolation
procedure may artificially smooth out growth across these longer intervals. Hence, Models
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3.6 (benchmark) and 3.7 (adding Polyarchy) employ 5-year panel units. While results are
fairly similar, the FPE coefficient is somewhat larger in size and now weakly significant in
the model including Polyarchy. In sum, there is some, but not completely robust, evidence
suggesting that FPE is related to faster subsequent technological change, as measured by
TFP growth.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that political institutions that enhance key aspects of female political em-
powerment – pertaining to the representation, voice, and active participation of women in
politics and civil society – influence a country’s rate of technological change. Such em-
powerment should enhance technological change both through affecting the variety of new
ideas introduced into the economy as well as the selection of the more efficient ideas. Since
technological change is the key “immediate determinant” of long-term economic growth,
we also anticipate that female political empowerment has a substantial effect on economic
development.
Drawing on data from 182 countries and time series extending back to 1789, we found
fairly robust evidence for different implications from our argument. The most robust evi-
dence pertains to the implication that female political empowerment is positively related to
subsequent economic growth. This relationship holds up for different measurement strategies
and statistical specifications. Reassuringly, the relationship holds up when accounting for
country- and year-fixed effects, and female political empowerment is only correlated with
subsequently measured growth and not with contemporaneous or previous growth rates.
Second, as anticipated from our argument, measures capturing all three sub-components of
female political empowerment are individually linked to growth. Third, we also find rela-
tively (though not completely) robust evidence indicating that female political empowerment
relates to TFP growth, an indicator of technological change.
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Our results could have real-world relevance, insofar as some decision makers are more
concerned with economic performance than questions of justice and equity in representation,
inclusion, and protection of civil liberties across. We show that the inclusion of women in
politics may not only be justified by intrinsic, normative motives. There is also a more
instrumental “business case” for female empowerment, which might sway otherwise reluctant
social groups and decision makers to work for, or at least acquiesce to, the inclusion of women
in decision-making.
There is persistent under-representation of women in politics and lacking protection of
women’s civil liberties. Despite some progress, worldwide, in recent decades, countries – and
especially middle and low income countries – still vary a lot in female political empowerment
(World Bank, 2020b). In many places, there are still substantial restrictions on women’s
opportunities to participate in the economy on equal footing with men. Around a third of
the world’s countries restrict the freedom of movement for women, 40 percent have legal
restrictions on women’s decisions to join and remain in the labor force, and around 40
percent discriminate against women in their property rights legislation. Finally, in 115
countries, World Bank experts judge, women cannot run a business in the same way as
men (World Bank, 2020b). These striking inequalities are reflected in the composition of
the political institutions that have the power to influence the relevant legislation. In 2019,
only 24.6 on parliamentary seats worldwide were held by women (World Bank, 2020a), and
the corresponding number for cabinet seats was 20.7 (Union and women, 2019). Still today,
there is ample room for increased representation of and participation by women in many
countries. Our results suggest that, in these countries, there is also corresponding room for
more rapid technological change and economic development.
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A Online Appendix
In this appendix we present descriptive statistics and various robustness tests that were
mentioned, but not reported in tables or figures, in the paper. First, we present descriptive
statistics for all core variables used in the analysis, with histograms displaying the distri-
bution of our main independent and dependent variables. Second, we present additional
robustness tests employing the GDP data from Maddison. Thereafter, we present additional
GMM specifications on 5- and 10-year panels. Next, we show alternative tests on heterogene-
ity of the relationship across time, space, and regime type, using interaction models rather
than split-sample tests. Finally, we show robustness tests for the regressions with the three
sub-indices of our main Female Empowerment Measure as alternative independent variables.
i
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for main variables used in our analysis
Variable (source) N Mean Std. dev.
GDP p.c. growth (Fariss et al.) 20,622 1.202878 9.975378
GDP p.c. growth (Maddison) 16,525 1.945244 7.374358
Ln GDP p.c. (Fariss et al.) 20,828 7.602531 1.062199
Ln GDP p.c. (Maddison) 16,695 8.048396 1.139924
Ln TFP (Baier et al.) 8,462 4.842124 .4978569
Female Political Empowerment (V-Dem) 21,853 .4072885 .2660364
Women’s Civil liberties (V-Dem) 26,348 .4201775 .2949111
Women’s Civil Society Participation (V-Dem) 26,000 .3535175 .2746444
Women’s Political Participation (V-Dem) 22,200 .4072169 .3147054
Polyarchy (V-Dem) 24,995 .2634506 .2614406
Impartial public administration 26,160 -.1091299 1.432628
Resource dependence (Miller) 13,529 3.560869 9.716799
Ln population (Fariss et al.) 20,828 8.516353 1.687284
ii
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Figure A.1: Histograms over Female Political Empowerment Index and its sub-indices as
well as Ln GDP per capita (from different sources). Y-axes measure percent of observations.
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Table A.3: Alternative System GMM specifications
Endogenous regressors FPE FPE and (lagged) Ln GDP p.c.
Lags used for instrumentation 3–4 2–3
GDP source Fariss et al. Maddison Fariss et al. Maddison
b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t)
Female pol. emp. 0.318** 0.098 0.347** 0.418*** 0.280*** 0.281*** 0.143** 0.101**
(2.046) (0.653) (2.339) (2.751) (2.975) (3.002) (2.331) (2.135)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.994*** 1.435*** 1.004*** 1.153*** 0.981*** 0.949*** 0.988*** 1.093***
(43.498) (8.280) (44.015) (9.355) (45.490) (9.937) (83.086) (22.363)
Ln GDP p.c.t− 5 -0.435** -0.170 0.038 -0.109**
(-2.509) (-1.384) (0.444) (-2.105)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3165 3018 2762 2630 3165 3018 2762 2630
Instruments 123 123 126 126 251 329 257 337
Hansen J-test 0.527 0.222 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Ar(2) 0.663 0.283 0.099 0.310 0.497 0.262 0.587 0.295
Ar(3) 0.043 0.040 0.845 1.000 0.999 0.058 0.078 0.331
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. 5-year panel units; DV measured in year t+ 5.
v
Table A.4: Interaction specifications assessing heterogeneity according to time period, region,
and regime type
b/(t) b/(t) b/(t)
Female political empowerment 2.313** 2.029** 2.965**
(2.258) (2.338) (2.598)
Female pol. emp. X post-WWII dummy -0.182
(-0.189)
Female pol. emp. X Western countries (dummy) 0.627
(0.787)
Female pol. emp. X Democracy (dummy) 0.331
(0.321)
Democracy -0.463
(-0.757)
Ln GDP p.c. -1.233*** -1.268*** -1.511***
(-4.925) (-4.795) (-5.412)
Country dummies Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
N 15879 15879 12760
R2 0.029 0.029 0.085
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS with errors clustered by country.
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